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Understanding employer engagement in youth labour market policy in the UK 
 
Abstract 
 
This articles applies van Gestel and Nyberg’s framework (2009) to analyse employers’ 
decisions about whether to engage in policies to help young people into work. The article 
identifies two main logics underpinning organisational decision making: an HR logic and a 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) logic.  It is argued that engaged employers see a clear 
alignment in those logics, whereas less engaged employers see few advantages in one, the 
other, or both areas. When this analysis is located within an institutional context that 
accounts for the agency of key actors, it is argued these logics explain decisions about 
whether or not to engage with particular labour market policies. 
 
Keywords: institutional theory, apprentice, human resource strategy, vocational education 
and training, qualitative research methods 
 
Introduction 
 
Young people are a vulnerable group in the labour market. Their vulnerabilities stem from 
both structural and cyclical changes in labour market demand. In common with many 
countries, unemployment and underemployment for those under the age of 25 in the UK 
jumped dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis (Office for 
National Statistics 2012). Although overall the UK labour market was remarkably resilient 
during the late 2000s, young people were particularly badly hit by the crisis and their 
unemployment has been more persistent than for other age groups (UKCES 2015). In 2015, 
young people aged between 16 and 24 made up only 13% of the UK population, but 40% of 
all unemployed people (UKCES 2015). The financial crisis and subsequent turbulent 
economic period exacerbated existing concerns about structural changes in youth labour 
markets that have had the effect of making young people’s transitions from education to 
work longer, harder and more unstable (Dolphin 2014, Bradley and Devadason 2008).  
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In response, national, regional and local governments have promoted a range of labour 
market policies in the effort to encourage employers to recruit and train more young people 
(Simms 2011). Initiatives have been wide-ranging and the exact focus has often been subject 
to the particular approach to labour market policy of the three main political parties. 
Nonetheless, at national level they have included initiatives such as employer subsidies and 
incentives for recruiting young people, the development and extension of apprenticeship 
provision, and continued commitment to a ‘youth’ and ‘apprenticeship’ national minimum 
wage substantially lower than the full adult rate. Of these, apprenticeships have been the 
core of State responses at all levels and by all political parties.  
 
Unlike small and medium sized enterprises, large employers generally have a high 
awareness of these initiatives (Richard 2012, Tu et al 2014), but there has been relatively 
low engagement (UKCES 2015). Even before 2008, for example, concerns were being 
expressed that take-up of apprenticeships was low (Delebarre 2015). Since 2008 there has 
been a significant policy push to promote apprenticeships, but concern is still evident about 
the barriers to employer engagement.  
 
A question therefore emerges as to why employer engagement is so low. This has important 
implications for our understanding of how labour market policies work to create particular 
outcomes for groups of vulnerable workers, and also reveals important insights into how 
employers engage in institutions of labour market regulation more generally. The 
observation that “institutions matter” (Kaufman 2011) is a mantra across many academic 
disciplines. In management, the seminal work of DiMaggio and Powell (1991) highlighted 
how deeply embedded organisations and managerial decision making are within their 
institutional contexts. Within studies of human resource management, this ‘institutionalist 
turn’ has been particularly developed by authors such as Meyer and Rowan (1977), Boon et 
al (2009) and Paauwe and Boselie (2003). This article contributes to these debates in two 
ways. First, by extending the work of Boon et al (2009) to identify what leads employers to 
engage with labour market policies such as apprenticeship provision. Second, by showing 
that employers have agency to shape that institutional context within which they operate. 
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This extends and develops the importance of institutional fit as a concept to explain the 
limitations of labour market policies to help vulnerable workers in the UK context.  
 
Analytical framework 
 
Institutions can be understood as enduring social structures and processes that give 
meaning. In the case of labour markets, institutions can include legal regulations, collective 
bargaining, and skills development structures. In the field of human resource management, 
institutional fit is a concept developed in an important paper by Boon et al (2009; 493) and 
is defined as “the alignment between HRM and the institutional environment.”  The authors 
argue that organisations conform to expectations of stakeholders (government, unions, 
employees etc.) because it increases their legitimacy and, therefore, their chances of 
survival. Institutional legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995; 574).  
 
Van Gestel and Nyberg (2009) propose an analytical framework to explain how national 
labour market policies translate into local HR practice at the organisational level. Developing 
work by Boxenbaum (2006), they identify three dimensions in the translation process: 
individual preference, strategic reframing and local grounding. Each is important in 
explaining how local policies reflect the national institutional context and they can be used 
as a framework to understand how employers respond to the institutional context in which 
they operate. Individual preference emphasises the agency of local actors in interpreting 
and implementing national policies. Policies can be interpreted in different ways and need 
to be ‘brought to life’ by the translation into the local setting. Czarniawska and Joerges 
(1995) show how this process of translation necessarily entails modification and adaption 
from national policy. However, as in the case of youth employment initiatives in the UK, 
national policies may not always be compulsory. So local actors not only make choices about 
how to modify national policies (Clegg et al 2006), but also whether or not to engage in the 
first place.  
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Strategic reframing refers to the ways in which the organisation’s strategic objectives 
influence the process of engaging with and translating national policies. Van Gestel and 
Nyberg (2009) importantly point out that in the area of HR policy, instrumental and value-
driven rationalities can create competing or complementing logics for how policies translate 
to local level (Paauwe 2004). Thornton and Ocasio (1999: 804) define institutional logics as 
‘the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, 
beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, 
organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality.’ The concept of logics 
helps link the agency exerted in organisational decision making to the wider social and 
institutional context. Looking for these logics shows how organisations create different 
translations of national policies. Local grounding refers to the necessary process of policies 
becoming enacted in local practices. As the local practices take on their own meanings and 
interact with other actors and practices, there are processes of modifying, adapting but also 
continuing their meanings. Importantly, studies in other areas such as studies of safety 
(Gheradi and Nicolini 2000) show that as practices are enacted and re-enacted they can 
become routines and accepted into organisational norms.  
 
This framework is important and is used to present the later empirical sections. However, 
although the van Gestel and Nyberg framework (2009) gives central attention to the agency 
of organisations in the downwards translation of national policies into organisational 
practices, they give no attention to the idea that organisations may have interests in 
influencing the institutional context itself. This is an important addition to understanding 
employer engagement in labour market policies.   
 
Institutional theories across academic disciplines have been increasingly engaged in 
understanding institutional contexts in a dynamic rather than static way (Jackson 2010). This 
approach has important advantages because it allows for an account of how institutions 
change, as well as how actors can exercise agency to (attempt to) influence institutions. A 
particularly helpful contribution here is that of Wailes et al (2003) who outline the value of 
taking an interest-based view of institutionalism in studies of HRM to explore how actors 
pursue their interests to different ends. The value of this approach is that it allows us to link 
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the micro-level organisational processes (Paauwe and Boselie 2003, Boon et al 2009) with 
macro-level analysis of how institutions shape and are shaped by actors’ interests and 
behaviour.  
 
As stressed by authors such as Suarez and Bromley (2016) interests are understood to be 
constructed and constituted by the environment. Actors are not understood to have a priori 
interests. Rather, they are what Meyer (1996) calls ‘soft actors’ or Meyer and Jepperson 
(2000) call ‘rationalised others’.  In other words, their interests are socially constructed and 
fundamentally linked to the external context within which they operate. Rather than simply 
being understood to be ‘rule makers’ or ‘rule takers’, actors and institutions are mutually 
constitutive of each other (Jackson 2010). Actors can therefore pursue their interests in 
shaping the institutional context (Wailes et al 2003). Following from this, if there is evidence 
that employers are seeking to shape labour market institutions then this is an important 
extension of institutionalist analyses of employer behaviour. It would illustrate not only that 
‘institutional fit’ matters in explaining employer behaviour (Paauwe and Boselie 2003) but 
also that employers can shape the institutional context.   
 
Armstrong (1986, 1988) unpicks some of the ways in which managerial interests within 
organisations are contradictory. As a result, it is impossible and largely undesirable to 
identify a single set of employers’ interests. Rather, the underpinning conceptualisation in 
this article is that competing logics can be empirically identified from which we can infer the 
basis of competing interests within organisations. In this way, tensions and contradictions 
within how employers think and behave allow us to ‘see’ how particular interests are 
developed, articulated and pursued. This is important in the context of an interest-based 
institutionalist approach because we can then ask questions about how employers pursue 
particular interests above others in an effort to shape the labour market institutions within 
which they operate.  
 
In light of the literature reviewed, this article has two related research objectives. The first is 
to apply the van Gestel and Nyberg framework (2009) in the UK context to develop an 
understanding of why employers engage (or not) with voluntary labour market initiatives 
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such as apprenticeships. The second is to explore whether there is evidence that employers 
act to influence the institutional context of youth labour market policy. The empirical 
material shows that the framework is extremely useful for explaining employer behaviour in 
this context, and that it should be extended to incorporate this more dynamic view of 
actors’ behaviour within an institutional setting. 
 
Methodology 
 
Empirical material was collected in a two-phase research design. The first developed 11 case 
studies of employers who are particularly engaged in youth employment initiatives, 
including apprenticeships. These employers were identified because of their involvement 
with a programme run by a third-sector organisation to help young people aged 11-16 with 
work-relevant skills. As part of the programme, these high-profile, large employers had all 
committed to supporting young people into work in a range of ways and had all signed a 
pledge to work “to be part of the solution, not part of the problem”. Table 1 presents 
descriptive characteristics of participating employers. All had apprenticeship programmes 
and were involved in other youth labour market initiatives. Telephone interviews were 
conducted with senior managers with policy responsibility for youth employment initiatives. 
Interviews took place in late 2012 and early 2013. Generic job titles of interviewees are 
included in Table 1. Typically interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes, were recorded 
and transcribed. Where it was not possible to record the interview, extensive handwritten 
notes were made and typed immediately after the interview.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The second phase ‘matched’ these highly engaged employers with similar employers who 
were known to be less engaged. For each organisation, the core characteristics of sector and 
size were used to identify a similar employer that was known not to have an apprenticeship 
programme. Apprenticeships were used as the matching criteria because it is the youth 
labour market policy that has the widest reach. As anticipated, it was empirically established 
that lack of involvement in apprenticeships is a proxy for a wider lack of engagement with 
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these initiatives more generally. The characteristics of the organisations are found in Table 
1.  
 
Three notes are important here. First, no matched engineering firm could be found and this 
reflects a long history of the use of apprenticeships in that sector which, in turn, reflect 
strong cultures of skills succession planning at firm level driven by long lead times and 
relatively stable recruitment patterns. A company of a similar size with similar skills 
requirements was therefore identified as the ‘matched pair’. It provides skilled services with 
strong internal labour markets and relatively few competitors. Secondly, the third less 
engaged hospitality employer was dropped from this analysis because of issues with the 
quantity and quality of data available. Thirdly, the focus was on selecting organisations that 
are aware of these initiatives but chose not to engage. Richard (2012) identified a significant 
issue within small and medium sized enterprises that the knowledge of these initiatives is 
low. That is undoubtedly a challenge for policy in this area, but is not an immediate 
empirical puzzle because the reasons for non-engagement are clear. This paper addresses a 
more complex empirical question which is to explain the differences between engaged and 
less-engaged organisations even when they are aware of these initiatives. For this reason, 
the selection of large organisations is not problematic, although it limits the generalizability 
of the findings.  
 
In total, 83 interviews were held with senior managers in the 20 organisations. Interviews 
were exploratory and focused first on a descriptive understanding of what the organisation 
does both formally and informally with regard to recruiting and managing young workers, 
and then on the reasons behind and consequences of those decisions. The interviews were 
designed to explore how key decision makers understand the dynamics and challenges 
around the central themes of a) recruiting and managing young workers in general and b) 
the engagement (or not) of the organisation in youth labour market initiatives. Interview 
data was inputted into Nvivo. The data were initially coded into the main themes that had 
been used to structure the data collection: 1) description of strategies and processes to 
recruit young workers, 2) rationale(s) for those decisions, 3) engagement with (or not) 
labour market policies to incentivise recruitment of young workers, and 4) consequences of 
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those decisions for the organisation. Emergent themes and sub-themes were then identified 
in addition to these initial codes. These were then clustered into a thematic analysis using 
van Gestel and Nyberg’s framework (2009) with a specific focus on identifying competing 
employer logics. 
 
Understanding employer engagement with youth labour market initiatives  
 
Using van Gestel and Nyberg’s framework (2009) allows insight into the ways that 1) 
individual preferences, 2) strategic framing and 3) local grounding play out within the 
organisations and explain why some employers engage with labour market initiatives to 
help young people and others do not. Using this framework to analyse the interview data, 
two logics are highlighted: human resource (HR) management logics and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) logics.  
 
HR and CSR logics are identified by interviewees to explain the decision to engage or not 
engage with apprenticeship policy. HR logics are understood as being related to the 
development of staff, planning for future staffing and skills needs, and similar central 
concerns of the HR function. CSR logics are identified as relating to the organisation’s role 
within wider society, being seen as a ‘good citizen’ and the risk of negative publicity from 
pursuing (or not pursing) a particular course of action. Van Gestel and Nyberg’s framework 
(2009) facilitates an analysis that illustrates how these logics can reinforce each other. In 
engaged organisations, the two logics tend to align to create the context where engagement 
is understood to be an effective way to pursue the employer’s interests. In less engaged 
organisations, these initiatives are understood to be against the employer’s interests in one, 
or the other, or both areas.  
 
Table 2 summarises the qualitative empirical evidence. The intention is to capture the 
extent and degree to which there is evidence of individual preferences, strategic reframing 
and local grounding in each of the organisational settings. Each area is discussed to highlight 
how they are evident in informing the decision of the organisation to engage (or not) with 
apprenticeships. 
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TABLE TWO HERE 
 
1) Individual preference 
 
The commitment of individual managers was highlighted in almost every interview with 
engaged employers. When asked why they had chosen to sign up to the initiative, almost all 
recounted a story about how an individual (often, but not always, them) had be persuaded 
of the importance through reading an article, having a conversation, or having a pre-existing 
commitment to the importance of youth employment initiatives. In some cases, these 
conversations were with training providers who tend to emphasise the potential business 
case around saving money on learning and development (L&D) activity and other HR 
concerns. In other situations, it related to a belief that employer-led training is an essential 
social responsibility and apprenticeships were a mechanism to fulfil that responsibility while 
also securing some State support. In other words, both HR and CSR logics featured heavily in 
deciding to engage.  
 
One important role of the champion in the organisations that engage was to overcome and 
address internal resistance to engagement. One senior manager reported: “It’s always an 
area where I’ll get a lot of grief. [For] All sorts of things. Why that budget heading doesn’t 
make a profit. How to persuade line managers. I’ve been persuaded it’s important. But they 
haven’t always.” (Operations Director, RetailCo2). Almost all of the senior managers in the 
engaged employers reported this kind of dynamic and reported that the personal 
commitment of key staff was essential in overcoming that resistance.  
 
Resistance was reported from two main sources: board level and line manager level. Board-
level resistance was typically reported to be about the financial aspects. Both CSR and HR 
arguments were important in addressing these concerns. Although the dynamics were 
different in each of the organisations, resistance tended to focus on questions about 
whether too much money was being spent on training, why training was delivered by third 
party providers, and whether retention rates justified the training expense. The central 
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difference between engaged and less-engaged employers was that in those that had 
established apprenticeship programmes and continued with them, the champion was able 
to address these questions. In less-engaged employers, either there was no champion 
presenting answers to these questions, or other voices were more powerful in the decision 
making process.  
 
Unit and line manager resistance took a slightly different form. Here the most pressing 
concerns related to the additional responsibilities of managing these staff. Although staff 
pay costs were generally lower (the apprenticeship and youth minimum wage rates are 
significantly lower than the full adult minimum wage) in many of the organisations line 
managers were reported as being dissatisfied with the additional managerial expectations 
and responsibilities. In practice, these ranged from having to oversee relatively complex 
training plans which were different from those of non-apprentice staff and covering periods 
where apprentices were not in the workplace because they were receiving off-the-job 
training. None of these were insurmountable but added a degree of complexity to hiring 
and managing apprentices which was not always welcomed at unit level. Senior manager 
champions were therefore important in not only influencing their peers at Board level, but 
also encouraging the development of apprenticeships at lower levels of the organisation.  
 
This need for a senior leader to champion an initiative such as the development of 
apprenticeship training programmes is particularly evident because of the requirement to 
work with an accredited training provider. These are typically either commercial 
organisations or local colleges that can deliver the off-the-job training required to accredit 
apprenticeship programmes. Finding an appropriate training provider with which to partner 
was central to the role of the champion because the risk of a mismatch of cultures and scale 
of provision.  
 
A similar emphasis on individual champions can be seen in the less-engaged employers. One 
interviewee in a largely un-engaged employer stressed: “It would have to be me that drove 
it. And I’m personally just not convinced it’s worth it. We spend money on training and I’m 
not sure what advantages we’d get from being accredited.” (Learning and Development 
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Manager, RetailCo4). Here, the HR business case was viewed as not having been 
demonstrated sufficiently. In this case, CSR logics did not feature. Indeed, a common point 
among the interviewees in organisations that did not engage was a down-playing or 
absence of the CSR concerns in the rationalisation of their decision making.  
 
By contrast, at all levels and with all audiences, champions in the engaged organisations 
drew on both CSR and HR logics to promote the decision to engage and to overcome 
resistance. Interviewees reported using a wide range of arguments to support engagement. 
Specific HR logics identified by interviewees included: developing a pipeline of talent, 
developing and retaining specific skills within the organisation, and identifying and 
rewarding staff with the potential to move into managerial or higher-level roles. CSR logics 
included being seen to “do your bit as an employer” (Operations Director, RetailCo2) and 
being seen to “be part of the solution [to youth unemployment] and not part of the 
problem” (HR Director, HospitalityCo3). These logics typically develop into a formalised 
expression of strategic direction of the organisations which is the focus of the following 
section.  
 
2) Strategic reframing 
 
The decision about whether or not to engage both informed and was informed by the 
strategic direction of the organisation. EngineeeringCo2 is perhaps the most striking 
example. Here there has been a long history of structured youth apprenticeships that was 
sustained even during periods where government support for apprenticeship training was, 
at best, ambivalent. The reasons for this commitment relate to a number of specificities 
about the sector including: the need for company-specific skills, the development of strong 
internal labour markets, and the need to plan skills succession years in advance. As a result, 
the effects of labour market policy around youth employment and skills for these 
companies is largely to subsidise activities that would be routinely undertaken whether or 
not government funding was available. This also explains why it proved difficult to identify a 
case study of a large engineering firm that did not have a youth apprenticeship programme. 
As the HR Director of a large engineering firm put it: “We’ve got to do this [training and 
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recruitment] no matter what…the funding is helpful but it wouldn’t change the basics of 
what we do.” (HR Director, EngineeringCo2).  
 
This can be contrasted strongly with the retail and hospitality companies. In both of these 
sectors, the dominant challenge arises from planning for future skills needs at company and 
sectoral levels. Strong expected future growth and a lack of employees being trained to 
managerial level mean that there are HR logics that drive engagement with apprenticeship 
programmes. This current and future skills gap has been central to these companies 
developing strong internal training programmes. Interestingly, these are sometimes not 
advertised beyond existing employees. These are sectors that hire large numbers of young 
people and are popular destinations for first employment from education. For these 
organisations, labour supply at entry level is rarely a problem. Their concern is retaining 
employees and developing staff into managerial positions. Structured apprenticeship 
programmes allow them to develop training that potentially takes successful staff to 
managerial level in the form of an accredited qualification equivalent to degree-level. 
Explaining the main strategic challenges in the sector, one Operations Director in the 
hospitality sector noted: “The problem we have is that they [young employees and potential 
recruits] don’t see it as a career. They have their first job in a pub, but they don’t think that 
they could be earning 50 grand [£50,000] in a few years’ time. And nor do their parents.” 
(Operations Director, HospitalityCo1). 
 
However, not all retail and hospitality companies have responded to government initiatives 
in this way. The four ‘matched’ employers that are less engaged have clear reasons for this 
choice. The example of RetailCo4 highlighted above illustrates this. Once staff have 
demonstrated that they understand and deliver the core values of the organisation, the 
learning and development team, together with line managers, identify the aspirations of 
individual employees and seek to develop an internal career and training as appropriate. As 
the HR Director put it: “Why would we want to accredit that? It’s not relevant because once 
we’ve recruited them, we don’t want them to move on from [RetailCo4]. We don’t want to 
make it easier for them!” (HR Director, RetailCo4).  
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This is important because it shows very clearly that employers who choose not to engage in 
government initiatives are not necessarily ‘bad’ employers. Sometimes the strategic logic of 
the organisation mitigates against engagement. RetailCo4 has detailed learning and 
development plans for every member of staff and was happy to show anonymised examples 
to researchers. They have a clearly articulated HR strategy at corporate, national and unit 
(store) levels. They are very aware of government initiatives and regularly field calls from 
both training providers and civil servants trying to persuade them to participate. Their 
decision not to is articulately defended and makes strong reference to their strategy of 
wanting to manage these activities without external influence (accreditation and quality 
process) and wanting to retain the staff they recruit. For them, their HR logics are clearly 
defined in ways that take them along a different strategic path and lead to non-
engagement. The price paid by these organisations is that they cannot draw down 
government funding to support L&D activities, but this was largely seen as an acceptable 
trade-off for the autonomy. In this case, then, the organisation’s HR strategy clearly 
informed the decision not to engage. For them, recruitment, learning and development are 
firmly HR decisions and CSR logics rarely feature.  
 
RetailCo3 is also interesting case because it shows an example where senior managers had 
made judgments that there were few or no positive aspects of either the HR case or the CSR 
case. Here, the organisation had a problematic history of having engaged with a previous 
government initiative around unemployment. This was not specifically targeted at young 
people, but was a form of ‘workfare’ where participants who had been claiming 
unemployment support for six months or more had been required to undertake a short 
period of unpaid work experience. This scheme had been targeted by campaigners against 
workfare and participating employers had been ‘named and shamed’. Having had this 
problematic experience, RetailCo3 saw very little benefit to engaging with other labour 
market initiatives. In other words, the CSR logic had no strategic leverage within this 
organisation. In addition, there was a strong, and empirically supported, view that creating 
apprenticeship schemes would simply generate large numbers of applications from poor 
quality candidates, meaning that there little perceived HR logic to engaging. Here, the two 
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logics combined and meant that this organisation was strongly set against engagement and 
had a clear strategy to avoid engaging with future initiatives.  
 
These examples highlight how the strategic decisions of these organisations are both 
informed by and inform the decision as to whether or not to engage with these youth 
labour market initiatives. Those strategic decisions can be informed by both HR and CSR 
logics which can reinforce each other to form powerful rationales for engagement or non-
engagement. 
 
3) Local grounding 
 
Local grounding refers to the process by which these decisions are performed and 
reinforced so that they become normal, and sometimes even routine, practices. Again, this 
is a helpful way in which to understand some of the decisions made. A particularly good 
example was given by one interviewee who had worked as a senior HR manager in both the 
UK and Austria succinctly summed up the tensions between HR concerns and CSR concerns: 
“In Austria, our concern was that if we didn’t take on our fair share of apprentices, it would 
be bad for business. We would have been known. And named and shamed. In the UK, it’s 
the opposite. If we take people on, we risk getting labelled a bad employer.” (Senior HR 
manager, ServicesCo1.) When pushed as to where she saw the potential for reputational 
damage, she was clear. “There’s a lot of concern about apprenticeship rates [of pay]. I think 
it’s only a matter of time before unions or campaigns target that. Quality. Completion rates. 
People are worried about all those things.” This example illustrates how this interviewee 
believes that there are CSR risks to engaging with these initiatives in the UK. It also shows 
how these perceptions are seen as ‘norms’ in these different contexts.  
 
This international example is unusual because most of the managers interviewed had little 
experience of working overseas, even within the multinational organisations. Nonetheless, 
this process of locally grounding these decisions about whether or not to engage can be 
seen in most of the organisations. One example is the need to link with an accredited 
training provider in order to develop apprenticeship provision. This requires an on-going 
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relationship with that provider. Most case study organisations relied on third party 
providers (mostly colleges or independent training organisations) for at least some of the 
off-the-job training, as well as to help to navigate the complex and changing regulations, 
accreditation and quality assurance. The relationship between the employer and the 
training provider was routinely reported as being essential in ensuring that apprenticeship 
programmes was delivered according to the business needs of the organisation.  
 
For engaged employers, this relationship ensured that procedures for hiring, training and 
managing apprentices are routinized and embedded within organisational procedures 
because of the need to record and demonstrate practices for accreditation and quality 
assurance processes. Although the process of being audited for quality purposes was 
typically seen as a problematic aspect of being accredited to deliver apprenticeship training, 
it undoubtedly had the effect of pushing organisations to formalise and routinize 
recruitment, training, progress, and management of young recruits, and sometimes more 
widely. Through this process, line managers in engaged organisations embedded these 
practices in day-to-day activities.   
 
This was perhaps most clearly evident in ProfessionalCo2 where recruitment, training and 
management of support staff was historically more ad hoc than for professional staff. 
Introducing an apprenticeship scheme for support staff meant that “We’ve just had to get 
more professional at developing them… We have to keep far more records so we can show 
what they’ve been doing. It’s good. It’s forced office managers to think harder about how 
they deal with other staff too.” (HR manager, ProfessionalCo2).  
 
One company, EngineeringCo2, had embedded these processes even more strongly by 
setting up a section of the company which was accredited as a training provider but worked 
only with them. It was referred to as “The College” and had a designated building within the 
site where apprentices completed at least the first year of their training. EngineeringCo2 is a 
large employer, in a geographically isolated location that recruits young people directly from 
secondary education to develop firm-specific skills. Although they experience a relatively 
high drop-out rate of around 30% in the early years, the successful apprentices are highly 
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likely to work for the firm for the majority of their careers. Apprenticeship training was 
integral to their internal labour market, so having a section of the organisation accredited as 
a training provider was a logical step to ensuring that firm-specific skills could be delivered 
by specialists.  
 
The decisions of the less-engaged employers also became locally grounded so as to 
reinforce their decision not to engage. ConstructionCo2 had taken a strategic decision not to 
engage informed in large part by the fact that there is a training levy within this sector that 
is paid by many large employers, including this organisation. The contribution of the 
employer to the levy reinforced a decision that youth training was not something they 
wanted to engage with more extensively and this was reported to be widely understood 
within the organisation. In this case, the logic of having “already done our bit” (Senior 
manager, ConstructionCo2) was regularly reinforced.  
 
Again, in both engaged and less-engaged employers, the HR and CSR logics can be seen in 
the process of locally grounding the policies. The example of ProfessionalCo2 above shows 
how the professionalization and routinisation of HR practices reinforced and was reinforced 
by the engagement in these initiatives. EngineeringCo2’s College also routinizes training and 
development. An important role of training providers is to ensure record keeping is accurate 
and up-to-date for accreditation quality control purposes. These systems locally ground HR 
policies within the organisations. CSR logics are also visible in the processes of locally 
grounding these practices. The examples given above of ‘doing our bit’ become norms 
reinforced by strategic decision making within the organisations. Engaged employers use 
CSR and HR logics to reinforce each other and push local actors to enact the policies and 
practices required in apprenticeship training. Less engaged employers either see risks in 
doing so, or see conflicts in the competing logics.  
 
Employers as actors within institutions 
 
The previous sections have applied van Gestel and Nyberg’s (2009) framework and 
extended it by identifying two logics that explain employer engagement, or not, with these 
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labour market initiatives: HR and CSR logics. This is useful because it shows how important it 
is to explain and understand employer behaviour in the context of the institutions within 
which they operate. However, a centrally important argument of this article is that 
employers are not simply passive with regard to their external institutional context; they 
can seek to influence that context. 
 
Concerns over the structure and running of apprenticeship programmes and incentives to 
hire young people were widespread, even in the organisations that engaged. Specifically, 
concerns related to the complexity of these programmes, regulation over the design and 
award of apprenticeship qualifications, and the requirement to work with an accredited 
training provider to meet quality assurance standards. Quality assurance of apprenticeship 
training sits within the remit of the education quality watchdog, Ofsted, which requires 
employing organisations and training providers to demonstrate they meet national quality 
standards. These aspects of these initiatives were both problematic for employers who 
engage with them and off-putting for organisations who were not engaged because of the 
perception (often correct) that they detracted from the core HR logic of the business.  
 
One senior manager in a large employer that is considered a lead organisation in promoting 
apprenticeships stressed that the institutional structure of apprenticeship training was 
leading the company to reconsider its future engagement. He said: “The problem is that it’s 
difficult to get buy-in. It’s difficult to explain to the Board why we need to be Ofsted-ed for 
something that we would be doing anyway. We’re reassessing whether it’s worth it going 
forward. Would we be better off just bringing it [training] all in-house?” (Operations 
Director, HospitalityCo2). Here both the CSR and HR logics are being eroded within the 
organisation. In response, this interviewee had given evidence to several evaluations and 
reports of apprenticeship policies, emphasising that, for them, it was important that the CSR 
logic of “doing the right thing” (Operations Director, HospitalityCo2) did not dominate policy 
assumptions, and that policy development also paid close attention to the practical 
implementation of the initiatives.   
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The interviews revealed that many employers did understand themselves as having some 
agency in shaping the institutional context. For example, the Operations Director of 
HospitalityCo3 made clear their involvement in shaping the form of apprenticeship 
provision: “We’ve been involved in the design [of apprenticeships] process. Some of the 
learnings have come straight from us…Risk management of [young people] under 18s [in a 
licenced workplace]. That’s a good example.” In this case, the HR logic of running the 
programme to develop skills brought risk and potential for reputational damage. Ensuring 
there were effective mechanisms to manage that risk were effectively integrated into 
national training standards. By articulating this CSR logic within policy consultations, 
HospitalityCo3 sought to help other employers integrate CSR and HR logics. 
 
These two employers show not only that they believe they have a degree of agency, but that 
their views are actively being sought by policy makers and others. Their experiences were 
quite widely echoed, especially among engaged employers. In some cases, employers had 
been contacted through sectoral or local networks and asked for their views about their 
experiences with particular aspects. This was evident in the decision in 2015 to develop 
apprenticeship ‘trailblazers’ which are groups of employers who work together to design 
new apprenticeship standards for their sector. Indeed, the emphasis on employers as having 
agency in developing these institutional structures was clearly laid out in the government 
document English Apprenticeships: Our 2020 vision which opened with the statement 
“Nobody understands the skills employers need better than the employers themselves. That 
is why we are placing them in the driving seat.” (BIS 2013). This idea of the ‘employer 
ownership of skills’ (UKCES 2011) has become central to the principles of developing the 
institutional context in this area of labour market policy.  
 
The point that employers have agency in shaping the institutional context is an important 
extension of the idea of institutional fit within our understanding of HR theory and practice. 
It gives a more dynamic view of the interaction between employers and their institutional 
context, extending work of authors such as Paauwe and Boselie (2003). Importantly, it also 
emphasises that employers pursue their interests to influence the form and functioning of 
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institutions of labour market regulation, even where the underpinning logics are multiple 
and complex.  
 
Discussion: competing logics and employer agency 
 
This article has explained decisions by employers about whether they engage with voluntary 
labour market policies around youth employment and training. Since the late 1990s, there 
has been a notable turn towards institutionalist analyses of HR strategic decision making 
(Purcell 1999, Paauwe and Boselie 2003, Boon et al 2009). The evidence here uses the 
framework proposed by van Gestel and Nyberg (2009) to show how individual preferences, 
strategic reframing and local grounding work to inform and embed employers’ decisions. 
Particularly significant factors explaining engagement are the presence of a champion within 
the organisation, a strong fit with the organisation’s strategic direction, and processes that 
routinize and professionalise training delivery at local level.  This is an important extension 
of the use of this framework to a setting where the choice about whether to engage with 
these labour market policies is voluntary as previous studies using this framework have 
sought to explain how engagement with compulsory labour market policies is enacted at 
local level.  
 
Extending this, the analysis identified the logics that inform those decisions. Two logics were 
identified that actors draw on when explaining decisions to engage (or not) with initiatives 
to help young people into work: HR and CSR logics. In some organisations, these combine to 
create a situation in which engagement with apprenticeships is argued to be valuable for 
the organisation. These engaged organisations see the HR benefits of engagement as 
relating to developing a skills and talent pipeline as well as drawing down government funds 
for training. CSR logics relate to a view that engagement is socially valuable or necessary to 
be regarded as a ‘good employer’. By contrast, employers that chose not to engage with 
apprenticeships explained there to be an absence of HR logics, CSR logics, or both. This 
identification of two related, but discreet, logics is important because from it, we can infer 
that there is not a simple conceptualisation of the interests of these actors within 
institutional settings (Armstrong 1986, 1988, Meyer 1996). Rather, employers’ interests in 
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this realm - as in others - are complex, contradictory and overlapping. The evidence 
indicates that only where the HR and CSR logics work together is there enough momentum 
to engage. 
 
The empirical evidence also shows how employers both respond to and try to influence the 
institutional context; here labour market policies around apprenticeships. The van Gestel 
and Nyberg (2009) framework is important in identifying factors and processes that explain 
engagement and non-engagement, but it is also evident that some employers understand 
themselves as being able to shape the policy context. The logics that can be identified in 
explaining engagement can also be seen in work undertaken by employers to affect the 
institutional context. By drawing on the interplay between actors and institutions, we can 
identify a more dynamic view of the ‘institutionalist turn’ in HR analyses (Wailes et al 2003). 
 
Following the insight that there are multiple and contested logics for employers’ actions in 
this area, it is unlikely that we could ever identify a single common interest of employers as 
they seek to influence the policy context. Nonetheless, an interest-based institutionalist 
approach is helpful as it encourages attention on the dynamic interaction between actors 
and institutions (Wailes et al 2003). This article has shown how employers are both 
influenced by and seek to influence the institutional context with regard to initiatives to 
help young people into work. We see that HR and CSR logics are consistent in these 
processes. This is an important development of arguments about institutional fit between 
HRM and the wider institutional context (Boon et al, 2009). It emphasises the dynamic 
interaction between employers and the wider institutional context showing not only how 
employers make decisions about whether to engage, but also that they seek pursue their 
multiple interests to shape those institutions. The central argument is therefore to highlight 
the internal dynamics of decision making within organisations, the external dynamics of the 
institutional setting, and how they interact to explain employer behaviour. This extends 
existing analyses that have developed within HRM that emphasise the importance of 
institutional contexts on managerial decision making (Paauwe and Boselie 2003). This 
approach may prove to be a fruitful future avenue of analysis as it also prompts us to 
explore in more detail the ways that employers use their agency in shaping the institutional 
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context through, for example, bringing pressure to create systems of apprenticeship training 
that suit their interests.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This article set out to compare employers that are engaged with initiatives to help young 
people into work, with those that do not engage. This is important because it helps 
understand the constraints and limitations of labour market policy and how employers act 
when confronted with a wide range of pressures towards contradictory objectives. 
Importantly it also has the potential to inform discussions about why uptake of policies to 
help young people as a disadvantaged group are so patchy even where employer knowledge 
of these initiatives is high and where there are financial incentives in place to help fund 
employer training.  
 
The empirical contribution of the paper has been to identify two, sometimes competing, 
logics that explain employer actions in this regard: interests around human resources (the 
relative costs and benefits of recruiting appropriate staff, developing needed skills etc.) and 
corporate social responsibility interests (being seen to be good corporate citizens, 
reputational risk etc.) The case studies illustrate that employers engaged in these initiatives 
explain that they see CSR and HR logics as reinforcing each other. In short, for them, 
developing an apprenticeship programme allows them both to develop the skills they 
require and promote their corporate social responsibility. Employers that are less engaged 
tend to see tensions between the costs and benefits within these two logics. Typically, they 
see these programmes as either bringing complexity – and therefore costs – to what is 
usually a routine activity of hiring and training, and/or they are concerned for reputational 
risk. This empirical contribution allows us to better understand the pressures on employers 
as they make HR decisions as centrally important actors within labour market policy making 
and implementation.  
 
Interest-based institutionalism is used as a way to understand the behaviour of employers 
as actors within broader labour market institutions and focus attention of how they pursue 
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their interests. This is a helpful lens through which to examine this question because it 
focuses attention on both the structural pressures and the constraints on employer action, 
while also acknowledging that employing organisations have agency within labour markets 
and can, and do, behave accordingly.  We see that CSR and HR logics are also important in 
framing employers’ interventions in policy. Some employers are keen to develop policy in a 
direction that allows other employers to integrate CSR and HR logics. While others 
emphasise that policy initiatives cannot simply draw on the CSR logic of expecting 
employers to ‘do the right thing’. In short, the policy context must recognise that both need 
to come together to facilitate engagement.  
 
These findings have important implications for wider policy initiatives intended to help 
other groups of vulnerable workers into employment. Policies that draw primarily on 
expectations that employers will engage because it is the ‘right thing to do’ (CSR logic) are 
likely to be weaker than those that also offer clear HR benefits to the organisation. This 
article also strongly suggests that policy makers need to acknowledge that employers are 
important actors within the policy context. It therefore seems likely that policies developed 
through active employer engagement would result in wider uptake.    
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Table 1 – Research sites 
 
 Apprenticeships1 Key objectives of 
engagement 
Planning for future 
skills needs 
Engagement in other 
youth initiatives? 2 
Interviewees 
ENGAGED       
RetailCo1 Yes – medium 
intake (40+ pa) 
Retention and need for 
management capacity 
Strong internal labour 
markets for retention 
No HR Director 
Operations Director 
Unit manager x 2 
RetailCo2 Yes – small 
intake  
(10 pa) 
Retention and need for 
management capacity 
Strong internal labour 
markets for retention 
Yes – work programme UK HR Director 
Learning and 
Development specialist 
Operations Director 
Unit manager x 3 
HospitalityCo1 Yes – large intake 
(100+ pa) 
Retention and need for 
management capacity 
Strong internal labour 
markets for retention 
Yes – structured work 
experience 
Operations Director 
HR Director 
Learning and 
Development specialist 
Unit manager x 3 
HospitalityCo2 Yes – large intake 
(100+ pa) 
Retention and need for 
management capacity 
Strong internal labour 
markets for retention 
Yes – pre-
apprenticeship 
traineeships 
Operations Director 
Brand Director 
Apprenticeship lead 
Unit manager x 2 
HospitalityCo3 Yes – large intake 
(100+ pa) 
Retention and need for 
management capacity 
Strong internal labour 
markets for retention 
Yes – pre-
apprenticeship 
traineeships 
HR Director 
Unit manager x 3 
                                                          
1 Approximate annual intake classified: 0-10 = small, 11-50 = medium, 50+ = large 
2 Except ad hoc work experience 
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PublicSector1 Yes – small 
intake (<10 pa) 
Recruitment freeze and 
downsizing 
Strong internal labour 
markets 
Yes – work programme HR Director 
Learning and Training 
lead 
Local (unit) manager x 2 
EngineeringCo1 Yes – medium 
intake (40-50 pa) 
Apprenticeship as 
‘norm’ 
Strong internal labour 
markets – firm specific 
skills 
Yes – pre-
apprenticeship 
traineeships 
HR Director 
Head of Apprenticeship 
College 
Line manager x 2 
EngineeringCo2 Yes – large intake 
(~90 pa) 
Apprenticeship as 
‘norm’  
Strong internal labour 
markets – firm specific 
skills 
Yes – paid internships  HR Director 
Learning and Training 
Lead 
Line manager x 1 
ProfessionalCo1 Yes – medium 
intake (40 pa) 
Concern about 
narrowing of access to 
profession 
Strong internal labour 
markets but also 
strong outflow after 
training 
No HR Director  
Professional body – lead 
for training policy 
Learning specialist 
Line manager x 3 
ProfessionalCo2 Yes – small 
intake (<10 pa) 
Focus on developing 
skills for support staff  
Weak internal labour 
markets for support 
staff 
No HR Director 
Training manager  
Line manager x 3 
ConstructionCo1 Yes – small 
intake (10 pa) 
Sectoral training norms 
for large employers 
Weak internal labour 
markets 
No Apprenticeship lead 
Line manager x 2 
      
 Apprenticeships? Key reasons for not 
engaging 
Planning for future 
skills need 
Engagement in other 
youth initiatives? 
 
LESS ENGAGED      
RetailCo3 No Bad experiences with 
other programmes 
Costs and complexity 
Strong internal labour 
markets but not 
qualifications focused 
In the past – not 
currently 
HR Director 
Learning and training 
specialist 
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Unit manager x 2 
RetailCo4 No programme – 
but 1 from highly 
disadvantaged 
background 
Little interest in 
developing 
transferable/accredited 
skills 
Strong internal labour 
markets but not 
qualifications focused 
No UK HR Director 
Learning and deve 
lopment specialist 
Unit manager x 3 
HospitalityCo4 No Cost and complexity Weak internal labour 
markets 
No HR Director 
Unit manager x 2 
HospitalityCo5 No Problematic 
experiences with 
apprenticeship training 
provider 
Cost and complexity 
Relatively strong 
internal labour 
markets, but ‘poaches’ 
from sector 
No Senior HR manager 
Learning and 
Development specialist 
Unit manager x 3 
PublicSector2 No Strong existing training 
and entry structures  
Extremely strong 
internal labour 
markets, but not 
qualification focused 
No Operations Director 
Training specialist 
Line manager x 2 
ServicesCo1 No – although 
considering 
developing 
Perceptions of 
bureaucracy 
Strong L&D systems to 
ensure skills planning 
No Senior HR manager with 
apprenticeship lead 
Unit manager x 2 
Professional3 No Seen as not relevant to 
the sector – even for 
support staff 
Strong emphasis on 
graduate recruitment 
then internal training.  
Paid internships (2 
months) for students 
and recent graduates 
Learning and 
Development specialist  
Line manager x 2 
Professional4 No Some interest, but 
concerns about cost 
and complexity 
Strong emphasis on 
graduate recruitment 
then internal training 
Paid internships (3 
months) for students 
HR Director 
Training manager 
Line manager x 1 
ConstructionCo2 No – although 
subcontractors 
may have 
Cost and complexity Training levy within 
the sector – active 
within sector skills 
development plans 
No Apprenticeship lead 
Line manager x 2 
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Table 2 
 
 Individual 
preferences 
Strategic reframing Local grounding 
ENGAGED  Senior 
champion(s) 
influencing 
Board and 
cascading 
policy and 
practice 
HR logics used 
to explain 
engagement 
CSR logics 
used to 
explain 
engagement 
Evidence that 
engagement is 
embedded at 
unit/line manager 
level 
RetailCo1 √ ++ ++ + 
RetailCo2 √ ++ ++ + 
HospitalityCo1 √ ++ +++ ++ 
HospitalityCo2 √ ++ ++ ++ 
HospitalityCo3 √ ++ ++ + 
PublicSector1 √ + + + 
EngineeringCo1 √ +++ + +++ 
EngineeringCo2 √ +++ + +++ 
ProfessionalCo1 √ + + + 
ProfessionalCo2 √ + + + 
ConstructionCo1 √ ++ + + 
    
LESS ENGAGED  HR logics used 
to explain non-
engagement 
CSR logics 
used to 
explain non-
engagement 
Evidence that non-
engagement is 
embedded at 
unit/line manager 
level 
RetailCo3 X _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
RetailCo4 X _ _ _ _  _ _ 
ServicesCo1 X _ _ _ _ 
HospitalityCo4 X _ _ _ _ 
HospitalityCo5 X _ _ _ 
PublicSector2 X _ _ _ N/A _ 
Professional3 X _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Professional4 X _ _ _ _ _ 
ConstructionCo2 X _ _ _ N/A _ _ _ 
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